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The power of eminent domain is basic to the concept of state
sovereignty' and may be delegated to and exercised by municipal
corporations.2 Ordinarily, the proceeding is a relatively simple in
rem action in which the condemnor obtains title to the con-
demned land, and the court determines "just compensation" for
the landowner as required by the South Carolina Constitution.'
City of Spartanburg v. Kimbrell's Investment Co.' is not
typical of most eminent domain proceedings. This case involved
a decision by the City of Spartanburg to condemn thirteen feet
of land to widen a street. On this small plot was a building which
adjoined another building owned by the defendant Kimbrell, the
two being separated by a joint or party wall. These two buildings
along with several others had once been part of a single structure
known as the Harris Theater Building. After completing the nec-
essary steps, the city proceeded with its plans to demolish the
building on the condemned property.
The original action by the city against Kimbrell was brought
to determine the rights of the parties with respect to the joint wall
separating their respective parts of the building. The city was
granted the right to remove its portion by giving due notice to the
defendant, which could then take the measures necessary to con-
vert the joint wall into an outside wall and to shore the remainder
of the building. Demolition of the city's portion of the building
ceased when it became evident that the entire building was in
danger of collapsing. Kimbrell had not shored its portion, prefer-
ring to wait until the cost of shoring could be estimated. When it
became evident that the cost would be prohibitive, Kimbrell noti-
fied the city of its intention to vacate the building. The city
responded by obtaining an order authorizing it to charge the cost
of structurally altering Kimbrell's portion of the building to Kim-
1. Tuomey Hospital v. City of Sumter, 243 S.C. 544, 134 S.E.2d 744 (1964).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-68.1 (1962).
3. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 17, provides: "Private property shall not be taken for private
use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use without just compensation being
first made therefor."
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brell so that the city could safely demolish the condemned por-
tion.5
Referring simply to article I, section 17 of the South Carolina
Constitution, the supreme court found the order of the lower
court "clearly in error" because, in directing Kimbrell to pay for
the alterations, the lower court had authorized a "taking of pri-
vate property without the consent of the owner and without any
compensation therefor."6
II. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF REAL PROPERTY
A. Zoning
The recent rise in popularity of multifamily housing units
has created problems for local zoning boards, most often in the
form of requests for exceptions to zoning ordinances. In the case
of Holler v. Ellisor7 the issue was whether a county zoning board
of adjustment has the power to grant "special exceptions"' to the
applicable zoning ordinance. The holder of an option to purchase
certain tracts applied for a permit to erect multifamily housing
within a residential district. This application was denied and the
option holder appealed to the zoning board for a special excep-
tion. The board granted the exception, after which Holler ap-
pealed to the court of common pleas and won a reversal.
In affirming the common pleas court, the supreme court
compared the authorized powers of county boards of adjustment
with those of municipal boards. The court pointed out that
county boards have the "power to hear and decide appeals in
cases of asserted error and the power to authorize variances in
cases of 'unnecessary hardship' under certain circumstances
[prescribed by statute], but there is no provision authorizing the
5. The order also held Kimbrell guilty of willful and intentional contempt of court
based on Kimbrell's failure to shore the condemned building. The supreme court dis-
missed the contempt charge because the lower court order required only that Kimbrell
appoint an engineer to deal with unforeseen emergencies during demolition.
6. 259 S.C. at 215, 191 S.E.2d at 155.
7. 259 S.C. 283, 191 S.E.2d 509 (1972).
8. Seven Oaks Area of Lexington County, S.C., Zoning Ordinance No. 3-2.7, pro-
vides:
Special Exception: A use of land which is permitted in a particular zoning
district only after review by the Zoning Board of Adjustment which body, before
authorizing such use, shall find that the location and operation of the proposed
use shall not be detrimental to adjoining land or use.
1973]
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Board to grant 'special exceptions'." 9 The court deemed it signifi-
cant that the General Assembly in legislating with respect to
county boards of adjustment has consistently omitted empower-
ing them to hear and decide special exceptions.
In Whitfield v. Seabrook' the supreme court considered the
permittee's reliance on a building permit." Appellant Whitfield
was issued a valid building permit on August 4, 1971, for the
construction of an apartment complex. Prior to August 15, 1971,
there were no zoning regulations affecting the property in ques-
tion. On August 3, 1971, the Charleston County Council gave
final reading to a zoning ordinance with an effective date of Au-
gust 15, 1971, the pertinent section reading:
If, before the effective date of this ordinance, or amendment
thereof, a building permit was lawfully issued for a structure not
in conformity to this ordinance, or such amendment, the con-
struction authorized by such permit may not be started after
such date.'"
Appellant was advised of the effective date of the ordinance and
that he would be required to have started construction of the
project before that date. The permit was declared void in Octo-
ber of 1971 for lack of compliance with the zoning ordinance.
Whitfield admitted that he had not begun construction be-
fore August 15, 1971, but contended that his actions in reliance
on the permit had created in him a vested property right prior to
the effective date of the ordinance. In rejecting appellant's argu-
ment, the court observed that the only actions initiated by appel-
lant were prior to the issuance of the permit and thus could not
have been in reliance on it.' 3 The building permit alone created
no vested right. "[1It merely authorized him to act if. . . , at a
time when it was lawful, [he] exercised the privilege granted
9. 259 S.C. at 286, 191 S.E.2d at 510, construing S. C. CODE ANN. § 14-350.19 (Cum.
Supp. 1971). See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1009 (1962) which defines the powers of
municipal boards of adjustment, including specifically the power to hear and decide
special exceptions.
10. 259 S.C. 66, 190 S.E.2d 743 (1972).
11. For a thorough discussion of building permits in South Carolina, see Note, The
Building Permit and Reliance Thereon in South Carolina, 21 S.C.L. REv. 70 (1968).
12. Charleston, S.C., Zoning Ordinances § 30.50.50.
13. Whitfield's actions consisted of preparing plans and specifications which were
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him, . ..thereby acquiring a property right which could be pro-
tected . ... 14
The precise question presented to the court in Whitfield con-
cerned the effect of a valid, subsequent zoning ordinance on a
building permit which had not become vested. In the past this
jurisdiction has emphasized the purpose of, and the public inter-
est protected by, the ordinance rather than the extent to which
the permittee has relied on the permit. ' The question was before
the court in Palmetto Petroleum, Inc. v. City of Mullins,"5 but the
court decided the case on other grounds. In Whitfield the court
based its decision on the fact that appellant had not begun con-
struction, stating, "Under the provisions of the ordinance in ques-
tion, it was necessary for the appellant to show that construction
• . .[had] actually commenced by August 15, 1971."Il This rea-
soning coincides with the general rule followed in most jurisdic-
tions that the permittee's rights under a subsequent zoning ordi-
nance depend on whether his permit has become vested through
affirmative action.18 The court left open the question of exactly
how much action a permittee would have to undertake in order
for his property right to vest but suggested that the test is
beginning physical construction. 9 Such a test is undesirable from
the permittee-builder's point of view because it places a high
premium on physical construction. A builder necessarily has to
make tentative commitments and preliminary contracts which
would not be sufficient to protect his permit under the court's
test; yet the breach of these commitments would undoubtedly
injure the builder's business.
B. Restrictive Covenants
Finucan v. Coronet Homes, Inc.,2" concerned the enforce-
ment of restrictive covenants on residential property. Plaintiffs
were the owners of lots in a subdivision known as Millwood that
originally contained thirty-eight lots. The recorded restrictions
14. 259 S.C. at 70, 190 S.E.2d at 745.
15. See Douglass v. City Council, 92 S.C. 374, 75 S.E. 687 (1912).
16. 251 S.C. 24, 159 S.E.2d 854 (1968),
17. 259 S.C. at 70, 190 S.E.2d at 745 (emphasis added).
18. 1 E. YoKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 9-5, at 407 (3d ed. 1965).
19. 259 S.C. at 71, 190 S.E.2d at 745, citing Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 276 N.C.
48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969).
20. 259 S.C. 142, 191 S.E.2d 5 (1972).
1973]
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limited the application of the covenants to the platted lots and
''expressly declared that they should not affect the other land of
the developer."' 2' The dispute arose when lots were added to the
development and a second plat of Millwood, with identical re-
strictions, was filed. The second plat included the original thirty-
eight lots, although they were not set off in lots and blocks. The
new restrictions declared that they would be binding on all per-
sons claiming in the "development known as 'Millwood'. ' 22 The
plaintiffs, owners in the original subdivision, attempted to en-
force the new restrictions, but the lower court held that the re-
strictions imposed by the second instrument were not intended
for the benefit of the plaintiffs. The supreme court reversed, stat-
ing that there was no intention on the part of the developer to
create two separate subdivisions subject to different plans for
development. The court interpreted the original restriction limit-
ing the application of the covenants to the platted lots as a safe-
guard to the developer from any claim that his remaining lands
had become burdened by the restrictions on Millwood.
Heffner v. Litchfield Golf Co.3 involved a homeowner's at-
tempt to prevent the defendant Litchfield from building tennis
courts on two adjacent lots. Litchfield was the common grantor
of a subdivision which contained no restrictions on the recorded
plat. Each conveyance in the subdivision including plaintiff's
contained a list of restrictions, the first of which limited the lots
to residential use. The twentieth provision read:
It is understood and agreed that these covenants, conditions and
restrictions are made solely for the benefit of the Grantor and
Grantee herein and may be changed at any time by mutual
consent in writing of the parties hereto, their heirs, successors
or assigns."
The proposed tennis courts were to be built on two lots pre-
viously conveyed by Litchfield but thereafter reacquired. The
court seized on this fact to declare that appellants had no stand-
ing to enforce the restrictions against Litchfield because Litch-
field stood simultaneously as grantor and grantee of the two lots
and could modify or rescind the restrictions at its discretion.
21. Id. at 144, 191 S.E.2d at 6.
22. Id. at 145, 191 S.E.2d at 6.
23. 258 S.C. 447, 189 S.E.2d 3 (1972).
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Appellants, however, contended that Litchfield had inaugurated
a general residential scheme which appellants had relied upon,
thereby creating reciprocal negative easements by implication.1
5
In rejecting this argument, the court stressed that mutuality of
covenant and consideration, essential to the existence of a general
scheme of development, can only be implied when the common
grantor manifests his intention to subject the parcels conveyed to
common restrictions for the benefit of all grantees. By the express
terms of the restrictions, the benefits of each were limited to the
parties thereto, precluding any implication that the grantor in-
tended to create restrictions for the benefit of all purchasers in
the subdivision.2 6
III. NAVIGABLE WATERS
Two cases decided during the survey period concerned navi-
gable waters and, more specifically, South Carolina's claim to
all the state's tidelands, the area between the mean high and
low water marks on tidal, navigable waters. In State v. Hardee2 1
Claire D. Hardee was enjoined from trespassing upon, filling, or
otherwise changing that portion of her property constituting tide-
lands adjacent to Salt Creek at Pawleys Island. The state claimed
title to these tidelands, conceding to Mrs. Hardee only the land
lying above the high water mark, or about one-third of her origi-
nal purchase. Appellant Hardee denied the state's allegation of
ownership and claimed title to all the land down to the low water
mark. Her claim was based on a grant made in 1842 by the State
of South Carolina to Col. Peter Frazier, appellant's predecessor
in title.
The state admitted the validity of the Frazier grant so the
25. Easterly v. Hall, 256 S.C. 336, 182 S.E.2d 671 (1971); Edwards v. Surratt, 228
S.C. 512, 518-19, 90 S.E.2d 906, 909 (1956) stated the doctrine:
[W]here a common grantor opens a tract of land to be sold in lots and blocks,
and, before any lots are sold (emphasis ours), inaugurates a general scheme of
improvement for the entire tract intended to enhance the value of each lot, and
each lot, subsequently sold by such grantor, is made subject to such scheme of
improvement, there is created and annexed to the entire tract what is termed a
negative equitable easement, in which the various purchasers of lots have an
interest, and between whom there exists mutuality of covenant and considera-
tion.
26. See generally 20 Am. JUR. 2d Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 178
(1965).
27. 193 S.E.2d 497 (S.C. 1972) (3-2 decision).
19731
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only issue was whether appellant could prove good title to the
land down to the usual low water mark. The supreme court unan-
imously held that appellant had failed, finding nothing in her
deed or plat to indicate that her boundary was to extend below
the high water mark. The bases for the court's decision are two
common law rules of construction applied to grants by the sover-
eign:
When a body of land is bounded by . . . a tidal navigable
stream, the boundary line is the high water mark, in the absence
of more specific language showing that it was intended to go
below high water mark, and the portion between high and low
water mark remains in the State in trust for the benefit of the
public.
A deed or grant by the State of South Carolina is construed
strictly in favor of the State and general public and against the
grantee."
Applying these rules, the court requires a private claimant to
prove by specific language in the deed or plat the state's intent
to grant title beyond the high water mark." Because the appel-
lant in Hardee could not meet this burden of specificity, the state
prevailed.
Although it was unnecessary to the holding of the case, the
court considered the question of whether title to all tidelands is
held by the state." The majority adopted the controversial lan-
guage of Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-
Carolina Canning Co. 31 that "[t]he title to land below high-
water mark on tidal navigable streams, under the well settled
rule, is in the State, not for the purpose of sale, but to be held in
trust for public purposes. 32 This quotation has been correctly
28. Id. at 499, citing Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina
Canning Co., 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E.434 (1928) (construction favors the state); State v.
Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50 (1884) (boundary is the high water mark).
29. 193 S.E.2d at 501.
30. The majority misstated the case when it said that the state "alleges the ownership
of all tidelands in South Carolina . . . ." 193 S.E.2d at 497. The state actually only
claimed to be "owner of all tidelands, submerged lands and waters within the Pawley's
Island area of Georgetown County, South Carolina . . . which are the subject of this
action." Record at 5.
31. 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928). The rule was reaffirmed in Rice Hope Planta-
tion v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950).
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characterized as a dictum,3 although the State Attorney General
has consistently maintained that it accurately states the law.34
The majority, while adhering to Cape Romain, did not make
clear what meaning or effect the controversial language portends.
Taken literally, the quotation indicates that all tidelands are
owned by the state and may not be alienated by it. However,
because the majority in Hardee actually rested its decision on the
absence of a specific grant, all other pronouncements not clearly
embraced by that rationale are dicta. Moreover, though the court
reaffirmed Cape Romain, it did so subject to this caveat quoted
from Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Public Service
Authority: 5 "But we do not deem it necessary or proper upon this
appeal to determine under what circumstances and by what
method, if any, title might be acquired by private owners
.... "3 The majority also quoted with approval from a law re-
view article in which the authors reasoned that grants of tide-
lands are to be strictly construed but are not necessarily pre-
cluded by Cape Romain.37 Thus, at present, the court has not
accepted the argument that tidelands are held in public trust and
may not be granted to private owners.
Emphasizing that point, Justice Bussey, joined by Justice
Brailsford, concurred in the result in a separate opinion. Justice
Bussey distinguished between tidelands and submerged lands,
maintaining that "in this jurisdiction it is the 'submerged lands'
and not 'tidelands', which have traditionally been held in trust
by the sovereign."3 This conclusion, though perhaps historically
correct, ignores the expansion of the theory of navigability. Cape
Romain may indicate that, as waters other than stream beds
came to be considered legally navigable, the concept of sub-
merged lands tacitly but completely absorbed the concept of tide-
33. Logan & Williams, Tidelands in South Carolina: A Study in the Law of Real
Property, 15 S.C.L. REv. 657, 667 (1963); Horlbeck, Titles to Marshlands in South
Carolina, 14 S.C.L.Q. 288, 353 (1962) (parts 1 & 2); cf. Clineburg & Krahmer, The Law
Pertaining to Estuarine Lands in South Carolina, 23 S.C.L. Rxv. 7, 22 (1971).
34. See, e.g., [1970] S.C. REP. Arr'Y GEN. 329 (No. 3040). The Attorney General has
repeatedly expressed the view that title to all tidelands is prima facie in the state and
excluded from private ownership, excepting those tidelands previously conveyed to indi-
viduals by the Crown of England, the Lords Proprietors, or the state by specific grant.
35. 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950).
36. 193 S.E.2d at 500, quoting 216 S.C. at 530, 59 S.E.2d at 145.
37. Clineburg & Krahmer, The Law Pertaining to Estuarine Lands in South
Carolina, 23 S.C.L. REv. 7, 23 (1971).
38. 193 S.E.2d at 504.
1973]
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lands.39 Unfortunately, the majority's unfocused discussion leaves
this and other questions unanswered.
State v. Murrell's Inlet Camp & Marina, Inc.,40 involved title
to two acres of salt marsh that the defendant had filled to the
height of his contiguous land. The state claimed the land as
owner of all lands lying between the mean high water mark and
the mean low water mark in the Murrell's Inlet area. The defen-
dant answered that the land in question was above the normal
high water mark on the Atlantic Ocean and was therefore not
tideland.' By stipulation the only issue submitted to the jury was
whether or not the two acres were covered by the waters of the
normal high tide. Apparently, an equal number of credible wit-
nesses was presented by both parties in support of their positions.
In sustaining the jury verdict for the defendant the supreme
court, without citing authority, stated that this was a question of
fact and peculiarly within the province of the jury.
IV. BOUNDARIES
Gethsemane Baptist Church v. Nut & Bolt House, Inc.,42
concerned a dispute as to the correct boundary separating plain-
tiff's eight-acre tract from defendant's four acres. Plaintiff took
the position that key calls in two senior deeds correctly estab-
lished the disputed border. Defendant alleged that the calls in
plaintiff's deeds were erroneous and that a 1915 deed and survey
in its (defendant's) chain of title had described the correct bound-
ary. Defendant's position depended upon whether the 1915 survey
had been made in reference to certain monuments called for at
the corners of the disputed boundary line. The monuments had
disappeared and their original location could not be determined.
The county court gave controlling weight to defendant's 1915
survey, apparently on the assumption that the survey had located
the disputed corners. The supreme court reversed, finding no
reference to monuments, stone or otherwise, in defendant's 1915
survey at the crucial corners.
The court reiterated the established rule in South Carolina
that erroneous calls for courses and distances to stone monuments
39. Cf. Clineburg & Kramer, The Law Pertaining to Estaurine Lands in South
Carolina, 23 S.C.L. REv. 7, 17-18 (1971).
40. 259 S.C. 404, 192 S.E.2d 199 (1972).
41. Id. at 406, 192 S.E.2d at 200.
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referred to in deeds must yield to the actual position of the monu-
ments on the ground.43 However, if the monument itself has dis-
appeared and its original location remains undetermined, South
Carolina law is in accord with the general rule that corners must
be established by reference to the descriptive calls in senior
deeds.44 The court also speculated about the probative weight of
a junior conveyance that specifically contradicts the calls of a
senior conveyance as to the location of a lost monument, and
recognized that other jurisdictions give priority to the senior con-
veyance."
A per curiam opinion disposed of the appeal in Brunson v.
Graham," in which plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to
determine the true owner of a disputed tract of land. The contro-
versy arose after plaintiff proceeded to subdivide a newly pur-
chased 103 acre tract. Plaintiff then learned that one Wallace
claimed a portion of the tract. The supreme court found that
appellant Wallace's claim to the disputed property was based on
nothing more than where he thought his northern and western
boundaries were located. Appellant's claim to 5.46 acres appeared
even more frivolous because his chain of title consistently de-
scribed his tract as containing "two (2) acres, more or less." The
lower court held that since there was no competent evidence as
to the location of appellant's boundary the court was obliged to
fix the line in the most equitable manner. Not surprisingly, the
supreme court found nothing inequitable about limiting appel-
lant's claim to two acres.
V. MISCELLANEOUS
Cohen v. Blessing49 was an action for fraud and deceit
brought by the purchaser to recover damages from the vendor for
the sale of a dwelling house infested with termites. This case
indicates that the court is continuing in the direction charted by
43. Id. at 97, 190 S.E.2d at 750, citing Nelson v. Frierson, 1 McCord 232 (S.C. 1821).
44. 259 S.C. at 97, 190 S.E.2d at 750. See generally 11 C.J.S. Boundaries § 8 (1938).
45. Coffey v. Greer, 241 N.C. 744, 86 S.E.2d 441 (1955).
46. 259 S.C. 298, 191 S.E.2d 713 (1972).
47. Judge McGowan of the Civil Court of Florence County decreed that Wallace had
a valid claim to only two acres. Only Wallace appealed.
48. Knotts v. Knotts, 191 S.C. 253, 1 S.E.2d 809 (1939).
49. 259 S.C. 400, 192 S.E.2d 204 (1972).
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Lawson v. Citizens & Southern National Bank." Cohen brought
two actions against Blessing-the first for fraudulent conceal-
ment of a latent defect in the residence and the second for breach
of an implied warranty that the residence was fit for habitation.
In reversing the lower court ruling, the court said that the better
reasoned recent cases have imposed a duty on the seller of real
estate to disclose termite or insect infestation "in the property
known to him, but unknown to, and not readily observable upon
reasonable inspection by the purchaser."'- The court dismissed
plaintiff's second cause of action for breach of warranty, applying
the well settled South Carolina rule that there is no implied war-
ranty of fitness in a sale of real estate by an owner-occupant."2
In Shaw v. Still3 the plaintiff brought an action ex delicto
against the landlords of a house for injuries sustained when plain-
tiff fell on a defective step. The plaintiff had gone to the home of
the tenant for the purpose of employing him and fell as she left
the house. Defendants alleged that the complaint failed to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action ex delicto as to
them. The court dismissed the case on the authority that "[an
action ex delicto will not lie for the breach of a mere contractual
duty to repair because a tort is civil wrong other than a breach of
contract . . . . "5 The Shaw rationale is consistent with that
adopted by the majority of courts. A sizable minority, however,
has held a lessor's breach of an agreement to repair sufficient
grounds for finding him liable to his tenant, or someone in privity
with the tenant, if the failure to repair was a contributing cause
of the injury.
WAYNE WILLIS
50. 255 S.C. 517, 180 S.E.2d 206 (1971). See generally 37 Am. JuR. 2d Fraud and
Deceit § 158 (1968).
51. 259 S.C. at 403, 192 S.E.2d at 205-06, quoting Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 972, 977 (1968).
52. Frasher v. Cofer, 251 S.C. 112, 160 S.E.2d 560 (1968); accord, Lessly v. Bowie, 27
S.C. 193, 3 S.E. 199 (1887). See also Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792
(1970) (sale by a builder-vendor).
53. 259 S.C. 377, 192 S.E.2d 206 (1972).
54. Sheppard v. Nienow, 254 S.C. 44, 49, 173 S.E.2d 343, 345 (1970).
55. See Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1238 (1961), for decisions holding a landlord liable for
personal injuries resulting from the breach of an agreement to repair. The American Law
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